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SYMPOSIUM
PREFERENCES AND RATIONAL CHOICE:
NEW PERSPECTIVES AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
MATTHEW D. ADLER,t CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN, t & PETER H. HUANGtt
The fifteen articles in this issue were originally written for a Sym-
posium entitled Preferences and Rational Choice: New Perspectives and Le-
gal Implications, held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on
March 1-2, 2002. The articles focus on the traditional economic ac-
count of individual rationality and the implications of recent criticisms
of that account for the law. The criticisms in many cases arose by ap-
plying the insights and methods of other disciplines to this fundamen-
tal problem in the economic literature. The issue brings together
economists, philosophers, psychologists, business and finance schol-
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ars, and lawyers in an effort to shed light on a question crucial for all
these disciplines: what is the correct account of individual human ra-
tionality? In this Introduction, we will sketch the contribution the ar-
ticles collected here make to the ongoing debate on this topic and ex-
plain the implications of that debate for the law.
The traditional economic account treats rational agents as seeking
to maximize their preferences. The preference-maximization model
has long been the dominant approach not only in economics, but also
in related fields such as psychology, decision theory, philosophical ra-
tional choice, and law and economics. The economic model under-
stands the notion of preference in terms of an agent's ranking of her
choices and of the various possible outcomes of those choices. In the
simplest case, where the agent knows for certain which outcome will
result from each choice, she is enjoined to choose the option leading
to the highest-ranked outcome. From a philosophical perspective, the
above criterion may seem to leave the notion of "preference" an
empty one, since it provides no way to assess the rationality of an
agent's choices with respect to some underlying state of satisfaction,
and so no way to assess independently whether an agent's choices
maximize her preferences. The traditional model does not restrict
the content of an agent's preferences. There is nothing irrational, for
example, about choosing to spend the day picking blades of grass in-
stead of making money or writing articles.
But the traditional account does place certain formal constraints
on the notion of a preference, and these help to make the preference-
maximization criterion more robust. In particular, preferences must
conform to the following three criteria: (1) completeness-an agent
must be able to rank any two items with which she is presented, unless
she is indifferent between the two; (2) transitivity--if an agent would
prefer an apple to an orange, and an orange to a banana, then it must
be the case that she would prefer an apple over a banana; and (3) re-
flexivity-an agent must be indifferent between an item and an identi-
cal item. An agent whose choices do not conform to these conditions
would be thought irrational, and her preferences could not be coher-
ently maximized.
What if an agent is choosing under circumstances of incomplete
knowledge? How can an agent's choices conform to the above criteria
if she does not know, for example, what the results of her choices will
be? The traditional model assumes that even if the agent does not
know with certainty the outcomes of her choices, she can evaluate the
options open to her if she at least knows what the chances are of end-
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ing up with one result or another. The model also assumes that the
agent's preferences can be measured numerically in terms of utility.
The model then stipulates that the utility of a given choice is equal to
the utility to the agent of one of the possible outcomes from that
choice, discounted by the probability of its occurrence, plus the utility
of the next possible outcome from that choice, discounted by its
probability of occurrence, and so on for all possible outcomes of a
given choice. The best choice for a rational agent, then, is the choice
that maximizes her preferences or "utility," adjusting for the probabili-
ties of which she is aware of obtaining specific outcomes.
What intellectual function is performed by the traditional eco-
nomic account of rationality, and more generally by any model of ra-
tional choice? In his article for the symposium issue, Lewis Kornhau-
ser carefully addresses this question, showing how models of rational
choice are employed to describe, explain, and evaluate choices, and to
facilitate.the design of institutions.' Much work in experimental psy-
chology, economics, and recently in law addresses the first of these
two issues. The crucial question is to what extent the traditional
model accurately describes and predicts individual choices. So-called
behavioral economists say that the answer is, "Not very well."
Some of the articles make important contributions to this debate
about the descriptive and predictive accuracy of the preference-
maximization model. Jason Johnston considers various ways in which
the behavior of human beings seems to be contradictory. For exam-
ple, people routinely spend large amounts of money to protect them-
selves against risks due to carcinogens and toxins, at the same time
that they engage in risky behavior like overeating or skydiving. But
Johnston argues that this behavior is actually consistent with the tradi-
tional model, and is not necessarily the result of irrationally placing
too much. weight on low-probability events. Similarly, Michael
Wachter suggests that the failure of market prices to reflect the true
value of a corporation might reflect not the irrational enthusiasm or
pessimism of investors, but rather information asymmetries between
managers and investors concerning the amount and variability of the
future cash flows generated by corporate projects.
Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Domain of Preference, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 717 (2003).
2Jason Scott Johnston, Paradoxes of the Safe Society: A Rational Actor Approach to the
Reconceptualization of Risk and the Reformation of Risk Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 747
(2003).
3 Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively
Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 787 (2003).
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A different ongoing debate concerns the success of the prefer-
ence-maximization model as a normative account of choice. Sympo-
sium contributors focus on three different ways in which the tradi-
tional model might be questioned. First, a number of articles discuss
the impact of the passage of time on an agent's choices. George Ainslie
and John Monterosso agree with the traditional model that agents are
rational to discount future goods.4 But Ainslie and Monterosso also
argue that a commonly observed form of discounting, known as "hy-
perbolic" discounting, in which the value of a good is inversely pro-
portional to delay, amounts to a kind of irrationality. Hyperbolic dis-
counting, according to Ainslie and Monterosso, "lead [s] to changes of
relative valuation among goods at different delays as time passes." 5 An
agent, for example, may prefer not binging tomorrow to feeling
bloated the next day, even though tomorrow he will prefer to binge.
Note that hyperbolic discounting is consistent with the traditional
model. The agent at each time has a complete ranking of outcomes
which his choice at that time maximizes. Although this ranking varies
intertemporally, the discounting formula that produces it does not.
Indeed, as Leo Katz shows, the phenomenon of intertemporal variabil-
ity in preferences over outcomes is paralleled by similar phenomena
in the moral domain, namely intertemporal variability in judgments of
harm and of wrongfulness." Our ex ante and ex postjudgments of the
harmfulness of an action might well diverge. One example Katz gives
is of an assassin who has just fired a bullet at his target but who has
missed.7 Imagine he is about to fire a second bullet. Before he fires,
one might consider the wickedness of this second attempt on his vic-
tim's life. At that point, we would have to conclude that it is every bit
as bad as the first attempt. Yet once the assassin actually fires, assum-
ing he misses once again, it seems unlikely that what he has done in
firing two bullets, and missing, is appreciably worse than firing one.
Joe Mintoff challenges the traditional model by arguing that ac-
tions that fail to maximize an agent's preferences or utility may be ra-
tional as long as they are selected in the context of a prior intention or
4 George Ainslie & John Monterosso, Will as Intertemporal Bargaining: Implications
for Rationality, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 825 (2003).
Id. at 830.
6 Leo Katz, Before and After: Temporal Anomalies in Legal Doctrine, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
863 (2003).
7 Id. at 863.
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plan." He says that a rational agent may adopt plans that call for a sub-
optimal action when comparing the cost of complying with the plan to
the net benefit the plan provides. If the net benefit exceeds the cost,
the plan is rational for him to adopt. Mintoff then argues that the in-
tention an agent forms acts as a filter on the agent's future delibera-
tions. So despite the fact that an individual might fare better by per-
forming an action that is inconsistent with his intention to perform
the suboptimal action, it is rational for the agent to stick to his inten-
tion when that intention is an essential part of an optimal plan.
A second way in which the traditional model arguably provides a
normatively flawed account of choice concerns risk. The traditional
model allows that an agent can be risk averse or risk loving with re-
spect to the components of outcomes, for example, the agent's wealth.
An agent might prefer the certainty of one hundred dollars over a ten
percent chance of one thousand dollars. But this model insists that
agents are necessarily risk neutral with respect to utility itself. Ned
McClennen criticizes this feature of the traditional model, suggesting
specifically that agents rationally seek to avoid losses with respect to
"primary goods"-goods such as bodily integrity, mental and emo-
tional integrity, and all-purpose resources such as money.9 McClen-
nen seems to suggest that agents might particularly dislike taking risks
with primary goods, even when the amounts of those goods are cali-
brated in utility terms, and not merely when calibrated in some nonu-
tility index.
Claire Finkelstein makes a related point in her article, arguing
that being at risk can itself be a kind of harm."' Intuitively, for exam-
ple, subjecting someone to a substantial risk of physical harm seems
itself to be a welfare setback-or, to put the point in preference terms,
an intrinsically dispreferable feature of outcomes. Thus an agent who
is exposed to a risk of harm, but who suffers no actual harm would be
in a worse position than another individual who also suffered no
harm, but who was not exposed to risk. Similarly, she argues that a
person who is exposed to a chance of benefit receives a benefit be-
cause of the exposure, even if she does not in the end gain the actual
benefit for which she had hoped. Both claims appear to violate the
assumptions of the traditional model, because the model assumes that
8 Joe Mintoff, Can Utilitarianism Justify Legal Rights with Moral Force?, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 887 (2003).
9 Edward F. McClennen, Prudence and Constitutional Rights, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 917
(2003).
10 Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Hatn?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963 (2003).
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an agent's preferences are entirely a function of the actual outcomes
she can expect.
Cass Sunstein also engages the subject of risk in his article on the
precautionary principle." Sunstein does not commit himself to thfe
traditional model, but he does provide strong arguments against the
precautionary principle, which he takes to be a competitor to the tra-
ditional model. The precautionary principle is widely espoused by en-
vironmentalists and has been endorsed by the United Nations and
many foreign governments, particularly in Europe. In its stiong
form, it says something like the following: "'When an activity raises
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships
are not fully established scientifically. ' ' 13 Sunstein argues'that this is
incoherent, since precautionary measures will themselves, quite typi-
cally, create risks of health or environmental harms.
A final controversial aspect of the traditional model, taken as a
normative account, concerns the permissible content of agenis' prefer-
ences. Peter H. Huang, Eric Posner, Jonathan Baron, and Bruce
Chapman all, in different ways, address this aspect of the traditional
model. Huang demonstrates how the traditional model of prefer-
ences can incorporate agents' feeling such emotions as guilt or
pride-and not merely be about preferences over their wealth or con-' 4
sumption. Huang demonstrates that (fiduciary) law is able to create
a socially desirable equilibrium by influencing individual investors'
expectations about how broker-dealers will behave, and those inves-
tors' expectations in turn influence the psychological payoffs to bro-
ker-dealers. This is a more nuanced, and hence more credible, ac-
count of why fiduciary law matters than accounts that explain fiduciary
law in terms of the preferences or constraints of broker-dealers. Pos-
ner makes the reciprocal point: the traditional model permits agents
to have "greedy" preferences, preferences that are wholly focused on
the agent's wealth or consumption and ignore all other (intuitively)
preferable features of outcomes, such as emotions, relationships, fair
it Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003).
12 For a survey of the development and application of the precautionary principle,
see THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTATION (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996).
'. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1006 (quoting Lessons fi'om Wingspread, in PRO-
TECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE app. A at 353-54 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999)).
14 Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1059
(2003).
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dealing, accomplishment, and so on. " Posner shows how judges
sometimes take greedy preferences to be problematic, even irrational,
but does not himself endorse the irrationality claim-in part given the
difficulty of distinguishing between appropriately "moderate" and in-
appropriately "greedy" preferences for dollars and goods.
Baron observes that the traditional model allows persons to have
what he calls "moralistic" goals (or preferences): "goals for the behav-
ior of others that are independent of the others' goals.' 16 Moralistic
preferences are, if not irrational, then morally unappealing, for we
would all generally be better off if no one had them.
Finally, Bruce Chapman points to a way in which the traditional
model may be too stringent with respect to the substantive content of
an agent's preferences. 7 Consider the case of an agent who, when of-
fered a large apple and a large orange, chooses the large apple. But
when offered the choice among both these fruits plus a smaller apple,
he chooses the large orange, for the reason that it would be a breach
of etiquette to choose the bigger of two items in the presence of the
smaller. This choice behavior violates the so-called Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (WARP), which is often seen as an implication of
the traditional model: "if an agent ever chooses an alternative x over
alternative y from some set of alternatives, then that agent should
never (on pain of inconsistency) choose alternative y over alternative x
from any other set of available alternatives.". In effect, WARP pre-
cludes the context of choice from counting as a preferable or dispref-
erable aspect of the outcomes resulting from choice. Chapman ar-
gues, however, that there are instances in which it is rational for
context to matter to an individual decision maker.
So much for the possible deficiencies of the traditional model as a
model of rationality. Why does any of this matter for the law? Clearly
the success or failure of a particular explanation of human behavior
has legal implications: which decisions people can be expected to
make is surely of great importance to judges, legislators, and adminis-
trators alike. But why does the success or failure of a given normative
account of rationality have relevance for the law? For example, why
would it matter to policymakers whether ideally rational agents would
15 Eric A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Greed, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1097 (2003).
Jonathan Baron, Value Analysis of Political Behavior-Self-Interested : Moralistic
Altruistic: Moral 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1135 (2003).
17 Bruce Chapman, Rational Choice and Categorical Reason, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1169
(2003).
18 Id. at 1175.
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adopt Mintoffian plan-rationality or McClennenesque prudence? The
symposium authors address this important question in a variety of
ways. The following are some of the more specific suggestions on this
topic.
First, the state might have reason to discourage citizens from mak-
ing irrational choices and encourage them to make rational ones.
This would, arguably, make sense if the action that promoted a per-
son's welfare were also the action it was rational for him to select.
Colin Camerer, Sam Issacharoff, George Lowenstein, Ted
O'Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin, in their joint contribution to the
issue, delineate a variety of legal mechanisms, short of outright pro-
scription, by which the state might seek to discourage irrational behav-
ior.9 These mechanisms are "asymmetrically paternalistic," in that
they create relatively large benefits for those who would otherwise be-
have irrationally, but impose relatively small costs for rational actors
whose behavior does not need to be improved. Camerer and his co-
authors are therefore optimistic about the usefulness of law in en-
couraging citizen rationality. Their optimism is not shared by Ainslie
and Monterosso, who express skepticism about law's ability to combat
the intertemporal irrationality created by hyperbolic discounting, '
nor by Posner, who is skeptical about the efficacy of judicial disap-
proval of greed in changing greedy preferences.2
Second, the fact that a legal institution would have been agreed
upon by citizens selecting their institutions in an antecedent position
of choice might serve tojustify that institution. Rationality, on a "con-
tractarian approach," becomes a standard by which to evaluate legal
institutions. Social contract views such as that of Rawls" famously ap-
peal to hypothetical rational approval under appropriate conditions as
an evaluative criterion for political and social arrangements. McClen-
nen follows this tradition when he suggests that the rationality of
avoiding substantial losses to "primary goods"justifies legal protection
for those goods in the form of constitutional welfare rights.13 On the
other hand, Matthew Adler argues against the view that rational ap-
provability provides a reason to favor any legal institution to which it
applies. Imagine that a governmental official is making a choice that
19 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case/or "Asymmetric Paternalism, "151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003).
Ainslie & Monterosso, supra note 4, at 862.
21 Posner, supra note 15, at 1129.
22 See generallyJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJusTrCE (1971).
23 McClennen, supra note 9, at 944-46.
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will affect law or legal institutions in some way. Imagine, too, that one
of the official's options is rationally approvable by each and every citi-
zen. Specifically, this option maximizes each citizen's preferences,
given each citizen's probability information at the time of the choice.
Does this fact provide the official a moral reason to choose the op-
tion? Adler argues that it does not; his argument casts doubt upon the
moral importance of "ex ante efficiency" and more generally seeks to
undermine any approach that evaluates possible laws, legal doctrines,
institutional structures, and so forth by asking which option citizens
24would rationally choose.
Third, normative accounts of choice can be directly applied to le-
gal actors. One might criticize particular types of governmental
choices as irrational and praise others as rational. For example, if the
traditional model provides the correct account of rationality, then le-
gal officials who deviate from the model and instead follow the pre-
cautionary principle would be behaving irrationally. This would
amount to a telling criticism of that principle. Sunstein not only
demonstrates the flaws of the precautionary principle as a normative
account of choice, but quite directly and understandably infers from
that premise the conclusion that policymakers ought not follow it.
Finally, the articles in this issue may help to shed light on the con-
flicts that arise between the economic criterion of welfare maximiza-
tion and the traditional noneconomic content of many legal rules,
such as rules that create rights. The reason is that enforcing or honor-
ing a legal right will often turn out to conflict with the demands of
welfare maximization. In such a case, how can state officials or citi-
zens have moral reason to enforce or honor the right? Recall Min-
toffs answer: certain state commitments or plans to recognize legal
rights function as "filters" constraining future official or citizen
choices, just as certain rational individual plans render rationally in-
25eligible some future choices on the part of that individual. But can
the nontraditional accounts of rationality do any better at integrating
rights into a rational actor approach to legal rules? Or does incorpo-
rating legal rules that articulate rights force us to abandon the rational
actor model altogether? Though the articles in this issue do not, indi-
vidually or collectively, contain answers to deeper jurisprudential diffi-
culties of this sort, our hope is that they will prepare the ground for a
broader discussion on such topics.
24 Matthew D. Adler, The Puzzle of "Ex Ante Efficiency ": Does Rational Approvability
Have Moral Weight?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1255 (2003).
25 Mintoff, supra note 8, at 908.
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